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ABSTRACT 
 Through comparisons with the rest of Central America, Costa Rica has stood out 
as an exceptional case in the region. Costa Rica’s economic, social, cultural, and political 
history form part of this exceptional identity. The purpose of this thesis is to assess how 
drug trafficking is threatening the characteristics that make up Costa Rican 
exceptionalism. Using the research methodology and data analysis, this paper examines 
the expansion of drug trafficking in Costa Rica since the 1980s and its progressive 
infiltration into the economic, social, and political spheres of the country. Moreover, it 
examines the crime environment stemming from the growth of drug trafficking in Costa 
Rica and the governmental response to its containment. Ultimately, this thesis concludes 
that while Costa Rica continues to enjoy an exceptional position in relation to the rest of 
Central America, drug trafficking is undermining its democracy, economy, and society. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
This thesis answers the question: How is drug trafficking threatening Costa Rican 
exceptionalism? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
“We, the Ticos, are different” 
—Fabrice Lehoucq,  
Investigating Under The Rain of San José 
 
Costa Rica is the exceptional case of Central America.1 “We, the Ticos are 
different,” is an expression that, according to U.S. political scientist Fabrice Lehoucq, 
Costa Ricans recite with great pride.2 Furthermore, Lehoucq classifies this expression as a 
dogma originating in the vision that Costa Ricans have of themselves, a product of the 
history of the formation of their state and democratic culture. Thus, it is not so absurd to 
think that exceptionalism is rooted in the national psyche of this country; therefore, the 
belief in this exceptionalism has been and continues to be projected to the rest of the world. 
Costa Rica’s exceptionalism is forged through comparisons with its Central American 
brothers, enjoying above others, one of the most stable and oldest democracies of the 
isthmus.3 The roots of this exceptionalism are also linked to the country’s early economic 
development through exports of the so-called “grain of gold (coffee),” the promotion and 
respect for human rights, its natural wealth, and its recognition as a peaceful nation.4 The 
latter is one of the points of great debate these days.  
 
1 Kirk S. Bowman, “New Scholarship on Costa Rican Exceptionalism,” Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 41, no. 2 (1999): 123, https://doi.org/10.2307/166410. 
2 Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq, “Investigando Bajo La Lluvia de San José,” in Ciencia Social En Costa 
Rica. Experiencias de Vida e Investigación, 1st ed. (Heredia, C.R.: EUNA, 1998), 43. 
3 John A. Booth, Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy, Nations of the Modern World (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1998), 1. 
4 Bowman, “New Scholarship on Costa Rican Exceptionalism,” 123–24. 
2 
Unlike many other nations worldwide, Costa Rica’s independence was the result of 
Central American emancipation from the Mexican Empire, and not the product of war.5 
Except for the 1948 Civil War, Costa Rican history books do not reminiscence on big 
battles to consolidate its state or to defend its nation; on the contrary, diplomacy seems to 
be mostly present in its history. Nonetheless, it is precisely the civil war of 1948 that 
brought many reforms for the future of Costa Rica, including abolishing the army.6 Thus, 
since the abolition of its army, Costa Rica has enjoyed greater international visibility as a 
country of peace and security, particularly highlighting its low levels of violence compared 
with the rest of Central America. However, the last decade has shown an upward trend in 
the levels of violence and its link to drug trafficking in Costa Rican territory.  
On February 15, 2020, Costa Rica reported the seizure of a shipment of more than 
five tons of cocaine in the port of Limón.7 According to the Costa Rican Drug Control 
Police (PCD), the drug shipment that had Holland as its destination is to date the largest 
drug seizure in Costa Rican history.8 However, not long after, and in the same Caribbean 
area of the country, Costa Rican authorities struck another blow to drug trafficking, 
managing to seize five tons of cocaine in two different operations. The first seizure resulted 
from the intervention on a boat sailing in the Caribbean Sea near the coast of Cahuita; the 
second, as a result of a vehicle chase in the community of Moin, a vehicle which at the 
time of its arrest was carrying a total of two tons of cocaine.9 Both seizures are evidence 
of the continuous trafficking of drugs in Costa Rican territory. 
 
5 Víctor Hugo Acuña Ortega, “La formación del Estado en Nicaragua y Costa Rica en perspectiva 
comparada: Siglos XIX-XX,” Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos 44 (July 1, 2018): 254–55, 
https://doi.org/10.15517/aeca.v44i0.34583. 
6 Fernando Sanchez, “Democracy after War: Causes and Consequences of the 1948 Civil War in Costa 
Rica,” Paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions, Uppsala University, Sweden, April 13–18, 2004. 
https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/PaperDetails/13964.2004, 18–19. 
7 BBC News, “Costa Rica Makes Biggest Ever Cocaine Haul,” BBC News, February 16, 2020, sec. 
Latin America & Caribbean, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51520615. 
8 Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, “PCD realiza el decomiso de droga más grande en la historia de 
Costa Rica,” InSight Crime, March 2020, https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/
PCD_realiza_el_decomiso_de_droga_mas_grande_en_la_historia_de_Costa_Rica.jpeg. 
9 Kay Valle, “Record Cocaine Seizures for Costa Rica,” Digital Military Magazine, 2020, 
https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/record-cocaine-seizures-for-costa-rica/. 
3 
The behavior of drug trafficking in Costa Rican territory is also echoed in the 
statistics compiled by the Costa Rican Drug Institute (ICD). According to the ICD, police 
forces seized 33 tons of cocaine and marijuana in 2018, a total of 47 tons in 2019, and in 
the first seven months of 2020, a total of 31 tons of drugs were seized.10 The above example 
illustrates how drug trafficking has infiltrated Costa Rican reality, the growing trend of 
which is reflected in the logistical role that the country has taken to drug cartels. 
Both Costa Rican and international authorities are clear in identifying Costa Rica 
as a logistical point for the drug cartels. As for the increase in drug trafficking, the Minister 
of Public Security of Costa Rica Michael Soto points out that even though the drug 
trafficking phenomenon is knocking on the door of all of Central America, Costa Rica’s 
geographical position favors the interests of criminal organizations.11 On this same point, 
the United States Department of State highlights in its 2019 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report, Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control, that due to the location, 
the vast maritime territory, and the size of the Costa Rican police force, it has become an 
attractive country for the transportation and storage of drugs.12 Taking advantage of these 
factors, the cartels have progressively expanded their centers of operations in Costa Rica 
with the collaboration of local criminal organizations and the recruitment of people from 
vulnerable groups. 
Drugs represent a threat to society, not only because of the effects of their 
consumption, but also because of the activities related to drug trafficking. As an example 
of the evolution of drug trafficking networks in the country, the former attorney general of 
Costa Rica, Jorge Chavarría, affirmed that the Mexican cartels are dedicated to enlisting 
 
10 Data adapted from statistics available on the website of the Costa Rican Institute of Drugs. 
http://www.icd.go.cr/portalicd/index.php/estad-uif 
11 Gabrielle Gorder, “Costa Rica’s Security Minister Talks Cocaine, Killings, and Organized Crime,” 
InSight Crime, March 23, 2020, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/costa-ricas-security-minister-
talks-cocaine-killings-and-organized-crime/. 
12 U.S. Department of State and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2019: Drug and Chemical Control 1 (March 2019): 142, 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02900343. 
4 
and training homegrown criminals.13 Chavarría also explains that cartels take the criminals 
recruited to drug trafficking “schools” in Mexico, where they instruct them in their methods 
for international drug smuggling.14 The final objective of the trainees is to replicate in 
Costa Rican territory the techniques learned and thus consolidate the dominance of the 
drug trafficking networks. Therefore, besides the already-problematic nature of drug 
trafficking, the expansion of the cartels comes with high levels of violence to assert their 
domain in the territory. Moreover, violence is one of the basic symbols by which cartels 
prove their territorial power.15 
The violence challenges this “Central American Switzerland.”16 As mentioned 
before, compared to its Central American neighbors, Costa Rica is mainly known for its 
paradisiacal and peaceful image; however, the increase in the homicide rate over the last 
few years challenges this status. Regarding the increase in violence, Chavarría is emphatic 
in associating the rise in homicide rates with the territorial control strategies of organized 
crime.17 It is no coincidence that by 2017, the country reported a rate of “12.1 homicides 
per 100,000 inhabitants,” the highest homicide rate in Costa Rica’s history.18 Although 
Costa Rica’s homicide rates still are significantly lower than those of other countries in the 
region, their steady increase has become a major concern for the Costa Rican government 
 
13 Leonardo Goi, “Costa Rica AG Says Mexico Cartels Are Recruiting, Training Local Groups,” 
InSight Crime (blog), March 27, 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/costa-rica-ag-says-mexico-
cartels-recruiting-training-locals/. 
14 José Meléndez, “Mafia de ‘El Chapo’ adiestra a centroamericanos: Costa Rica,” El Universal, 
February 12, 2017, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/seguridad/2017/02/12/mafia-de-el-
chapo-adiestra-centroamericanos-costa-rica. 
15 Brian J. Phillips and Viridiana Ríos, “Narco-Messages: Competition and Public Communication by 
Criminal Groups,” Latin American Politics and Society 62, no. 1 (February 2020): 4, https://doi.org/
10.1017/lap.2019.43. 
16 Name popularly used to refer to Costa Rica. Given its extensive forests, stable democracy, and non-
military presence. 
17 Goi, “Costa Rica AG Says Mexico Cartels Are Recruiting, Training Local Groups.” 
18 Maria Fernanda Ramirez, “What Homicide Statistics Reveal About Costa Rica’s Criminal Future,” 
Investigation and Analysis of Organized Crime, InSight Crime (blog), March 19, 2020, 
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/costa-rica-homicide-statistics/. 
5 
and its citizens (see Figure 1).19 Because of these reasons, this thesis aims to explore the 
evolution of drug trafficking in Costa Rica and its related activities, as well as the ways 
they can undermine Costa Rican exceptionalism. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Homicides Rates.20 
 
19 U.S. Department of State and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2020: Trends in Organized Crime 1, no. 2 (March 2020): 
124, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02900343. 
20Source: “Central America’s Turbulent Northern Triangle,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 
April 16, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-turbulent-northern-triangle. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is composed of two sections that will serve as a foundation 
for understanding the topics to be developed in the following chapters and that seek to 
provide answers to the research question. The first segment will review the scholarly works 
that analyze the relationship between Costa Rica’s geography and the interest of drug 
cartels in the territory. The second segment will review academic debates on the influence 
of geopolitics and the insertion of drug trafficking in Costa Rica. Overall, most of the 
literature that talks about the evolution of drug trafficking in Costa Rica agrees on the 
leading role that its geography, geopolitics, and topography have played in the expansion 
of transnational criminal organizations in the country.  
1. The Geopolitical Trap  
“Our geography has us prisoner” 
—Laura Chinchilla, former President of Costa Rica,  
interview, The Wall Street Journal 
 
Located between Nicaragua and Panama, bordering both the Caribbean Sea and the 
North Pacific Ocean, and slightly smaller than West Virginia, Costa Rica has land favored 
by paradisiacal settings (see Figure 2).21 For many years, its location, vast rainforests, 
beaches, volcanoes, and biodiversity have been an attraction for millions of tourists. Thus, 
the tourism industry has become one of the country’s economic bases, contributing directly 
and indirectly to 8.2% of the national gross domestic product (GDP) in 2018 alone.22 
Unfortunately, while this same topography and location drive Costa Rica’s economy, it has 
also drawn the attention of not-so-desirable visitors: drug cartels.  
 
 
21 “Central America: Costa Rica,” The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 
November 20, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cs.html. 
22 “Turismo aporta 8.2% del PIB de forma directa e indirecta en Costa Rica,” El Economista, accessed 





Figure 2. Map of Costa Rica.23 
Costa Rica has become another chess piece in the logistics operations of drug 
trafficking. In 2013, former Costa Rican president Laura Chinchilla told The Wall Street 
Journal, “Our geography has us imprisoned,” referring to Costa Rica’s vulnerable position 
among South American cocaine producers and the drug market of the United States.24 
Likewise, the Minister of Public Security Michael Soto echoes this argument, saying that 
the problem of drug trafficking in Costa Rica and the rest of Central America is associated 
 
23Source: “What Are the Key Facts of Costa Rica?,” Maps of World, accessed April 16, 2021, 
https://www.mapsofworld.com/answers/geography/what-are-the-key-facts-of-costa-rica/#. 
24 Marguerite Cawley, “Costa Rica Losing Its Fight Against Drug Trafficking?,” InSight Crime, 
March 27, 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/mexican-drug-trafficking-presence-in-costa-rica-
highlights-security-needs/. 
8 
with the location between producers and consumers of drugs. According to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, Crime and Development in Central 
America, 88% of the cocaine mobilized in Central America is headed to the United States, 
and Costa Rica stands out among the smuggling routes used by Mexican and Colombian 
cartels.25  
Furthermore, UNODC says that because of its topography and attractive position 
in the Central American isthmus and the ease of interconnection with North and South 
America, traffickers use Costa Rica to transport by air and land large quantities of cocaine 
through its Pacific and Atlantic coasts more and more frequently (see Figure 3).26 In 
addition to the extensive coastlines on the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean and the 51,000 km 
of land, Ellysa Pachico argues that drug smugglers use Costa Rica’s natural parks as a 
refuge to enable them to carry out their illegal activities, with less risk of being detected by 
the police authorities. To the extent that the 28 national parks that represent a quarter of 
Costa Rica’s territory, drug traffickers have found a vast paradise in the mangroves and 
jungles, with few inhabitants and little police surveillance, which they can use as storage 
and shipment points.27 In sum, the literature agrees that Costa Rica’s location plays a 
significant role in the increase of the drug trade across the country. 
 
25 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in 
the Crossfire (New York: United Nations, 2007), 12. 
26 Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment (New 
York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012), 33, https://doi.org/10.18356/493ae18b-en. 
27 Elyssa Pachico, “Costa Rica Parks Used as Drug Smuggling Haven,” InSight Crime (blog), August 
31, 2012, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/costa-rica-parks-used-as-drug-smuggling-haven/. 
9 
 
Figure 3. Cocaine Trafficking Routes in Costa Rica.28 
Further drawing on Costa Rica’s location, president Chinchilla alludes to the 
relationship between the increase in drug trafficking and the need for resources. Given the 
growth of criminal organizations in the country, Chinchilla was vehement about the 
country’s lack of resources to maintain effective border patrol and prevent the growth and 
reach of criminal organizations.29 The former Minister of Public Security, Gustavo Mata, 
agrees with Chinchilla, noting that Costa Rican authorities do not have the capacity to 
detect all the drugs that pass through the country. On this subject Mata explains, “This is a 
 
28 Source: Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat 
Assessment (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012), 33, https://doi.org/10.18356/
493ae18b-en. 
29 Cawley, “Costa Rica Losing Its Fight Against Drug Trafficking?” 
10 
tsunami. They take advantage of air space, land borders, maritime [routes]. It is a constant 
bombardment. While the police find one shipment, three or four more are entering.” 30 All 
in all, besides the need for resources for its fight, Mata makes clear the overwhelming 
increase in drug trade operations in Costa Rican territory. This argument is also supported 
by the U.S. State Department, which says that the geographic characteristics and capacity 
of Costa Rica’s police forces have become attractive factors favoring drug cartel 
operations.31  
Another group of scholars refers to the correlation between drug policies and drug 
trade expansion in Central America. The war against drug trafficking that has prevailed 
since the 1980s in North and South America, particularly in the United States and 
Colombia, stands out as one of the causes that has led to the multiplication and dispersion 
of drug trafficking routes in Central America. Although historically drug cartels have used 
Costa Rican waters, land, and air to transport drugs, the drug policies conducted by these 
countries have resulted in the making of a “balloon effect” in Central America, which in 
turn would explain the increase in drug cartel operations in Costa Rica.  
According to the Council of Hemispheric Affairs, “the ‘balloon effect’ is a well-
worn analogy used by drug policy analysts to illustrate the process by which drug 
production is displaced across national borders in order to evade eradication and 
interdiction efforts.”32 On the same note, Juan Carlos Garzón and John Bailey explain that 
with the balloon effect theory, drug policies for the eradication and interdiction of drug 
production or trafficking create a displacement effect due to the high mutability capacity 
of criminal organizations, which are constantly looking for new routes or ways to transport 
 
30 Asmann Parker, “Report Unravels Transnational Strands of Costa Rica Drug Trade,” InSight Crime, 
November 14, 2017, https://new.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/report-unravels-transnational-strands-
costa-rica-drug-trade/. 
31 U.S. Department of State and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2019.  
32 COHA, “The Balloon Effect, In Effect: Humala, Peru, and the Drug Dilemma (Part 2 of 2),” 
accessed November 22, 2020, https://www.coha.org/the-balloon-effect-and-displacement-part-2-of-2/. 
11 
drugs.33 César Villegas Herrera agrees with this explanation, and further argues that for 
example, the strategies implemented by Colombia and United States governments for the 
eradication of direct exports from the producing country (Colombia) to the consuming 
country (United States), caused the cartels to incorporate Central America among their new 
export routes.34  
Naturally, Costa Rica is no exception. In more graphical terms, by squeezing the 
balloon at both ends, the balloon does not remove the air but transfers it. Drawing further, 
Professor Bruce Bagley states in his article “The evolution of drug trafficking and 
organized crime in Latin America,” that the U.S. and Latin American and Caribbean 
countries’ approach to the drug war (mainly interdiction), has only been successful in 
forcing criminal organizations to change their smuggling and cultivation routes, yet has 
failed to eradicate or decrease drug trafficking.35 In summary, scholars highlight 
geopolitics as an influential factor in the emergence of drugs in Central America. 
2. The Influence of Geopolitics 
“The Reagan administration was the enemy of drug traffickers, but it was much more so 
of the communists.”  
Mercedes Muñoz, Drug Trafficking,  
Democracy and National Sovereignty in Costa Rica 
 
The geopolitical interests of the U.S. government in the 1980s influenced drug 
activity in Costa Rica.36 In the eighties, the world was immersed in the Cold War, a conflict 
that among its main actors included the Soviet Union and the United States. Influenced by 
 
33 Juan Carlos Garzón and John Bailey, “Displacement Effects of Supply-Reduction Policies in Latin 
America: A Tipping Point in Cocaine Trafficking, 2006–2008,” in The Handbook of Drugs and Society, ed. 
Henry H. Brownstein (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2015), 484, https://doi.org/10.1002/
9781118726761.ch23. 
34 César Villegas Herrera, “La Economía Ilicita Del Narcotráfico En Centroamérica. Análisis Del 
Mercado de La Cocaína y Las Respuesta Políticas de Los Estados,” Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos 
40 (2014): 249. 
35 Bruce Bagley, “The Evolution of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Latin America,” 
Sociologia, Problemas e Practicas 71 (January 2013): 107. https://doi.org/10.7458/SPP2013712333. 
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the conflict, during this period the United States’ foreign policy focused primarily on the 
fight against communism. The policy mainly known as the “Reagan Doctrine” stands out 
in these years, which also supported anti-Communist insurgents wherever they were.37  
With the expansion of the Cold War in the Latin American territories, the U.S. 
government was particularly interested in the territory of Costa Rica, seeing it as a strategic 
point in its fight against communism, given the closeness with its neighboring socialist 
governments. To the north, with Nicaragua, and to the south, with Panama, both 
governments were identified as undemocratic, militaristic, and close to the communist 
government of Cuba (see Figure 4).38 On the same note, Thomas Leonard says that during 
this same time, the political ideals of the newly elected President Luis Alberto Monge and 
the promise of economic assistance led Costa Rica to support the anti-communist struggle 
of the United States in Latin America. Nevertheless, the conditions imposed by receiving 
economic assistance as well as the demands of the U.S. government turned out to have a 
high cost for Costa Rica, accelerating inflation and the national debt, and aggravating 
socioeconomic differences in the country.39  
 
37 Bureau of Public Affairs Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, “Reagan 
Doctrine, 1985” (Washington, DC: Department of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of 
Public Affairs.), accessed May 1, 2020, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17741.htm. 
38 Muñoz, “Narcotráfico, Democracia y Soberanía Nacional en Costa Rica,” 33. 
39 Thomas M. Leonard, “Central America, U.S. Policy, and the Crisis of the 1980s: Recent 
Interpretations,” ed. Morris H. Morley et al., Latin American Research Review 31, no. 2 (1996): 199. 
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Figure 4. Map of Central American Countries.40 
The U.S. policies that focused on the fight against communism led to relegating the 
fight against drug trafficking throughout the Caribbean to the background; consequently, 
these policies led Costa Rica to take the same actions. Costa Rican scholar Mercedes 
Muñoz Guillén claims that: “the Reagan administration was the enemy of the drug 
traffickers, but it was much more so of the communists.”41 Muñoz Guillén also argues that 
the ambiguity on U.S. policies allowed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) security 
collaborators, including informant officers and pilots located throughout the Central 
American isthmus, to get involved in the same drug trafficking networks for which they 
carried out intelligence, due to the high revenue opportunities.42 Over this matter, Senator 
 
40Source: “United States Interventions in Central America,” accessed April 16, 2021, 
http://umich.edu/~ac213/student_projects06/student_projects/usica/main.htm. 
41 Muñoz, “Narcotráfico, Democracia y Soberanía Nacional en Costa Rica,” 35. 
42 Muñoz, 34. 
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John Kerry, leader of the United States Senate Subcommittee on Narcotics, Terrorism, and 
International Operations, attested to the adverse influence that the U.S. activities had on 
the development of Latin America’s drug trade.43 To sum up, the geopolitical interest of 
the United States has to date had an irreversible effect on the presence of transnational 
criminal organizations in Costa Rica. 
In this regard, Costa Rican history recounts the story of John Hull, an American 
mercenary who served as a link between the CIA and drug traffickers. According to 
statements given on American television by former Colombian drug trafficker George 
Morales, Hull had an airstrip located on his private property at the San Carlos Pier in Costa 
Rica, which was used for the supply of drugs and dispatch of weapons for the “Contras”44 
in Nicaragua.45 Morales also declared before the Kerry Committee that the CIA financed 
and protected Hull´s airstrip, explaining why there were large drug movements under the 
protection of the American government.46  
In this sense, the anti-communist geopolitical objectives of the U.S. paved the way 
for the expansion of drug trafficking into Costa Rican territory, which would even penetrate 
the branches of the government.47 Expanding on this argument, Jaime Darenblum also 
contends that drug cartels have Costa Rican authorities on their payroll in order to protect 
their drug shipments.48 
Recently, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in 
its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2020, warns of the growing 
incidence of transnational criminal organizations in the corruption of Costa Rican security 
 
43 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Crime and Development in Central America. 
44 The Contras were Nicaraguan rebel groups from 1979 to 1990, who were battling the communist 
Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction with support from the United States. 
45 Miguel Pedrero Gómez, Corrupción, las cloacas del poder: Estrategias y mentiras de la política 
mundial (Madrid, Spain: Ediciones Nowtilus S.L., 2010), 200. 
46 Pedrero Gómez, Corrupción, las cloacas del poder. 
47 Muñoz, “Narcotráfico, Democracia y Soberanía Nacional en Costa Rica,” 39. 
48 Jaime Daremblum, “The Americas: Costa Rica in Danger of Losing Its Clean Reputation.” The 




forces and the judicial branch, and at the same time highlights the work of the United States 
to reduce the reach of corruption.49  
Regarding this situation, Michael Soto recognizes that criminal organizations rely 
on corruption to maintain their operations, yet he assures that efforts are being made to 
ensure that there is no corruption in the country.50 In short, the expansion of corruption 
and drug trade in Costa Rica was impacted by U.S. anti-communist fight. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
“Good, sound research projects begin with straightforward, uncomplicated thoughts that 
are easy to read and understand.” 
—John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative,  
and Mixed Methods Approaches 
 
The aim of this thesis is to achieve four objectives: the first is to identify the 
characteristics that have given rise to the concept of Costa Rican exceptionalism; the 
second is to assess the current state of transnational criminal organizations in Costa Rica 
and the institutional capacities to combat its entrenchment in the country; the third is to 
understand the social, political, and economic effects of drug trafficking on the Costa Rican 
state; and finally, the main goal of this thesis is to establish the ways in which drug 
trafficking affects Costa Rican exceptionalism (see Figure 5). 
 
49 U.S. Department of State and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
“International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2020,” 125. 
50 Gorder, “Costa Rica’s Security Minister Talks Cocaine, Killings, and Organized Crime.” 
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Figure 5. Research Design Objectives Map 
To meet these goals, the research framework of this thesis will pursue the following 
general procedure: the collection and refinement of data, problem statement, identifying 
trends, data analysis, and finally, the development of conclusions. The first step of the 
research design consisted of gathering data related to keywords such as “Costa Rica,” “drug 
trade,” “criminal organizations,” and “exceptionalism.” The information was mainly 
gathered from academic research databases like Google Scholar, JSTOR, ProQuest, as well 
as information from the websites of Costa Rican and international institutions. Similarly, 
the analysis incorporated newspaper articles and publications on websites specializing in 
crime trends. 
I then classified the information according to the main variables and determined the 
applicability of the data in accordance with the research question. Next, through the 
analysis of the data, I organized the information into the variables that, in the opinion of 
this researcher, allowed me to accurately assess the effects of drug trafficking and 
organized crime in Costa Rica. Finally, I followed the words of John Creswell, who wrote 
that “Good, sound research projects begin with straightforward, uncomplicated thoughts 
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that are easy to read and understand.” 51 This research does not seek to discuss theories or 
arguments surrounding drug trafficking; on the contrary, it seeks to apply the available 
information to respond to the objectives set, through a simple and understandable language 
for expert and inexperienced readers in the field.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is composed of five chapters. In the first chapter, the research question, 
the problem statement, and the research design are established. The second chapter 
analyzes the origin and characteristics of Costa Rican exceptionalism. The third chapter 
explores the influence of criminal organizations and the political scene in Costa Rica. The 
fourth chapter seeks to provide an x-ray of the development of drug trafficking and 
violence in Costa Rica, as well as the institutional capacities to fight drug trafficking. 
Finally, the fifth chapter focuses on providing conclusions (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Thesis Overview 
 
 
51 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches 
(New York: Sage Publications, 2014), 26. 
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II. COSTA RICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
“Costa Ricans, who calls themselves ticos, have long prided themselves on being 
different from their neighbors in Latin America.” 
—Mitchell A. Seligson,  
Costa Rican Exceptionalism: Why the Ticos are Different 
 
“Pura Vida” is a saying representative of a nation forged between comparisons and 
a sense of uniqueness. By pronouncing the words “Pura Vida,” besides using them 
commonly as a form of gratitude, the Costa Rican reflects the citizen who grows up hearing 
that his land is blessed by peace, exuberant nature, and above all, a land that decided to 
exchange guns for books. Nonetheless, it is not enough to share a territory, the same 
language, or customs for individuals to develop a sense of belonging and identity; it is also 
necessary to have a common history that unites society and leads them to defend the 
identity they share. Costa Rica’s economic, social, cultural, and political history has shaped 
its national identity, but above all, its identity is influenced by its perception of 
exceptionality in the international arena. 
Mitchell Seligson presents this notion of exceptionalism, writing “Costa Ricans, 
who call themselves Ticos, have long prided themselves on being different from their 
neighbors in Latin America.”52 It is fair to say that Costa Rican exceptionalism could not 
exist without the continuous comparisons and illustrations of the differences that separate 
it from other nations. This chapter seeks to highlight the main characteristics that make up 
Costa Rica’s exceptional identity since its origin as a nation and throughout its history.  
A. FOUNDATIONS  
Costa Rica is an exceptional case in the recounting of Central American history. A 
comparatively balanced social and economic development, the scarcity of armed conflicts, 
respect for human rights, and a stable democratic system are some of the factors that have 
made Costa Rica stand out when contrasted with the history of other Central American 
 
52 Mitchell Seligson, in Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 90, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt5hjp4v. 
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countries. Regardless, the idea of Tico exceptionalism did not skyrocket overnight; on the 
contrary, according to history, its construction seems to have begun in the period of 
colonization. 
In the year 1502, Christopher Columbus set sail from Cadiz to undertake his fourth 
and last voyage to the Indies. On September 25, 1502, Columbus arrived at lands he later 
named “Costa Rica” (Rich Coast). After he arrived at Uvita Island, Columbus began his 
exploration of the territory with the objective of finding the sources of gold that adorned 
the jewelry of the first Indians sighted. Yet, the explorers soon discovered that, despite its 
name, Costa Rica was a land poor in minerals.  
Owing to the scarcity of mineral resources, the isolation of the territory, the 
inclement weather, and indigenous hostilities, the period of Costa Rica’s colonization was 
the last and the slowest in Central America.53 Once the conquest period was over, the first 
colonies of modern civilization began to form Costa Rica’s population, which was 
composed of creoles, mestizos, Indians, and blacks. By 1575, a high percentage of the 
native culture had either died from diseases transmitted by the Spanish or was subdued by 
them; therefore, the amount of population with European features was higher than the 
indigenous. Consequently, interracial marriage was extensive; however, unlike other 
Central American colonies, European traits and culture predominated in Costa Rican 
colonies.54  
John Booth convincingly argues “Almost from the outset Costa Rica’s development 
stood somewhat apart from that of its neighbors.”55 Although during this time social 
differences among Costa Rican colonies always existed, these differences were less 
pronounced than in the rest of the colonies belonging to the Captaincy General of 
Guatemala, of the Viceroyalty of New Spain. In contrast to the other colonies, and 
influenced by geographical isolation, Costa Rican society developed with greater 
 
53 Melissa Vogt, “Historic Account of Costa Rican Development:: The Creation of an Identity,” in 
Variance in Approach Toward a ‘Sustainable’ Coffee Industry in Costa Rica, Perspectives from Within; 
Lessons and Insights (London, UK: Ubiquity Press, 2019), 13, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv11cvx7c.8. 
54 John A. Booth, Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2018), 17–18. 
55 Booth, 17. 
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homogeneity and equity.56 Ultimately, Costa Rican egalitarianism influenced the 
structures of the political elites and the development of a democratic system. 
B. DEMOCRACY, REFORMS AND ABOLITON 
When it comes to democracy, Costa Rica has become a reference, for having one 
of the oldest and most stable democracies among Latin American countries.57 On 
September 15, 2021, Costa Rica will celebrate the bicentennial of its independence, and 
with it, a long democratic tradition. Costa Rica’s democratic tradition characterizes it, and 
its construction as a nation has revolved around this political system; consequently, its 
history has given it a notorious exceptionality. Through comparisons with the democratic 
processes of other nations, the notion of democratic exceptionality becomes evident. Costa 
Rica’s democratic system has traditionally received, from international organizations 
dedicated to the analysis of democratic indicators, higher qualifications than other Latin 
American countries. For example, the Freedom House Index for 2020 places Costa Rica 
among the highest indices of civil liberties and political rights in Latin America.58 
The 2016 Latin American Democratic Development Index (IDD-Lat) ranks Costa 
Rica third in Latin America and the Caribbean, and number one in Central America for its 
democracy.59 Similarly, the 2019 Democracy Index, compiled by the Intelligence Unit of 
The Economist magazine, which measures the levels of democracy of 167 states, places 
Costa Rica in 19th position worldwide, second place in Latin America, and first place in 
Central America. On a scale of 1 to 10, The Economist represents the sixty indicators 
valued, a scale that places Costa Rica in the category of total democracy with a score of 
8.13 (see Figure 7).60 According to these figures, despite the worldwide drop in democratic 
 
56 Booth, 19. 
57 Laura Álvarez, “El mito democrático costarricense y su impacto en la constitución de la práctica 
política en períodos de conflicto social,” Flacso-México, 2011, 1. 
58 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2020 -Costa Rica,” Freedom House, 2020, 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/costa-rica/freedom-world/2020. 
59 IDD-LAT, “Índice de Desarrollo Democrático de América Latina 20016” (IDD-LAT, 2016), 111–
14, http://idd-lat.org/2016/downloads/idd-lat-2016.pdf. 
60 Among the categories assessed are electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, government 
functioning, political participation, and political culture. 
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indexes, Costa Rica managed to increase 0.06 points concerning its rating obtained in 
2018.61 
 
Figure 7. Democracy Index 2019, Global Map by Regime Type.62 
Today’s Costa Rican democratic regime is the result of a long process of 
transformation from colonial times to its consolidation in the second half of the 20th 
century. John Booth highlights four factors of colonial life that influenced the eventual 
development of Costa Rican democracy, factors the rest of the Central American colonies 
did not experience. First, unlike other parts of Latin America, civil life advanced with less 
use of the armed forces, thus civilian rule has played a more important role than militarism. 
 
61 “Costa Rica Sube Un Puesto En El Índice de Democracia En Un Año de Retrocesos a Nivel 
Mundial,” Delfino, accessed January 31, 2021, https://delfino.cr/2020/01/costa-rica-sube-un-puesto-en-el-
indice-de-democracia-en-un-ano-de-retrocesos-a-nivel-mundial. 
62 Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, http://d1qqtien6gys07.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/
2020/01/Democracy-Index-2019.pdf 
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Secondly, a large part of the population was involved in farming, which led to less social 
and economic inequality. These elements contributed to the development of a culture of 
egalitarianism.63 
Third, Costa Rica’s early political maturity influenced its governmental 
development. Being farther away from the Captaincy of Guatemala, Costa Rica had greater 
autonomy to develop its government early on, circumstances that in turn provided it with 
greater experience and efficiency to govern itself after its independence. Finally, contrary 
to the experience of other colonies, even after independence, the conservatives and liberal 
factions that emerged in Costa Rica during colonial times mostly stuck to civility.64 
In 1821, after independence, Costa Rica gradually began to develop an open 
electoral system that over the years allowed it to evolve into a more democratic 
government.65 In the opinion of Costa Rican historian Iván Molina, the electoral practices 
of the seven decades after independence were more systematic than competitive. Achieving 
a democratic result was considered more of a possibility than a guarantee; however, this 
period lay the foundations for attaining total democracy.66 The following decades, with a 
more prominent institutional and structural development, allowed the electoral system to 
be more specialized and to meet the demands of society.67 Molina also highlights that 
during this period, three processes that influenced modern democracy stand out. First, there 
were brief periods in which the country was governed without a constitution.68 Second, 
there was the prevalence of electoral practices at the legislative and municipal levels, even 
in times of authoritarian presidentialism. Lastly, despite the economic restrictions on the 
 
63 Booth, Costa Rica, 2018, 35. 
64 Booth, 35. 
65 William Furlong, “La Democracia Costarricense: Desarrollo Continuo a Pesar de Las 
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67 Molina Jiménez, 52. 
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24 
right to vote enacted by the constitutions of 1841 to 1848 for first degree commissions, the 
electoral system remained in operation on the premise of male suffrage.69 
Contrary to the experience of most Latin American countries, in Costa Rica, the 
presence of authoritarianism had less strength.70 Although Costa Rica has not escaped 
authoritarian regimes, military presence, and electoral fraud, democratically elected rulers 
have predominated the country’s history since its independence.71 In the almost 200 years 
of independence, Costa Rica has had a total of forty-eight rulers, of which less than 15% 
qualify as dictators.72 As a result of the coup d’état of the government of Alfredo González 
Flores, the dictatorship of the Tinoco brothers (1917–1919) took place, being one of the 
most recognized dictatorships in the country’s history.73 Led by Federico Tinoco Granados 
as president and his brother José Tinoco Granados as minister of war, their dictatorship 
represents a highly repressive period of social upheaval and was plagued by human rights 
violations.74 After the Tinoco brothers’ dictatorship, the country experienced a final 
violent uprising with the 1948 Revolution, which was motivated by allegations of fraud in 
the presidential election of the same year. Ironically, an undemocratic event like the 
revolution gave way to the political changes that determined modern Costa Rican 
democracy.  
Following the consolidation of Costa Rica’s democratic state in the mid-20th 
century, its political system has stood out as an exception in the Latin American political 
landscape. The 1948 Revolution lasted only 44 days, but the conflict was the product of a 
decade of tensions and ideological clashes, woven mainly among economic crises, political 
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repression, social conflicts, and electoral fraud. Faced with these events, Costa Rican 
society questioned the capacity of its institutions and the political model that governed 
them, which is why, in the early 1940s, the first protests against the government of Dr. 
Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia (1940–1944) began to take place.75  
One of the main precursors of the social revolt was the central figure of the Social 
Democratic Party, led by José María Figueres Ferrer, better known as “Don Pepe.” As part 
of the alliance opposing Calderón’s government, Figueres initiated a movement to form a 
rebel army that confronted the opposition during the revolution. Finally, on March 12, 
1948, Don Pepe and his “Ejército de Liberación Nacional”76 officially started the 1948 
Revolution. This conflict counts as the most tragic outbreak of political violence the 
country has ever experienced to date and created a more consolidated society and 
politics.77  
Once the 1948 Revolution was over, Figueres Ferrer promoted the establishment of 
the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, intending to provide the country with a 
renewed institutional and political system. Led by Figueres, on May 8, 1948, the so-called 
Founding Junta of the Second Republic began to govern Costa Rica, thereby rising above 
the social and economic circumstances, and focusing its axis on democratic values. During 
these 18 months, the Founding Board of the Second Republic sought the peaceful 
reconstruction of the country, for which it promoted more than 800 decree-laws that would 
later be ratified by the Constituent Assembly.78 The ratification lay down the new legal 
and institutional foundations of Costa Rica, generating a movement of change for the 
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strengthening of democracy, as well as providing a greater social and economic balance.79 
The central objective of the Constituent Assembly was to enact a new constitution.80 
On November 7, 1949, Costa Rica’s Political Constitution of 1949 was approved 
and promulgated. The same constitution governs Costa Rica until today and is the base on 
which the entire legal system of the country rests. One day, after the promulgation of the 
1949 Constitution, the Founding Board of the Second Republic transferred presidential 
power to Otilio Ulate.81 This event marks the beginning of Costa Rica as a polyarchic state, 
which brought great political, economic, and social changes in the second half of the 20th 
century. Between 1949 and 1975, the institutional and political liquidation of any form of 
an authoritarian regime and the establishment of the Costa Rican polyarchy took place. The 
granted powers to the Legislative Assembly, through the constitution, made it the strongest 
in Latin America, being a tool of the constituents to prevent the abuse of presidential 
power.82 
The Costa Rican polyarchy was a unique political model in the Central American 
region during this period, where most of the countries were living under hegemonic and 
authoritarian political models (see Figure 8). According to the concept of polyarchy, coined 
by Robert Dahl, this form of government is an absolute democratic regime, in the ideal 
sense, which gives a voice to its citizens and ensures that their needs are met equitably; 
therefore, Dahl identifies polyarchy as the political regime that put democratic ideals into 
practice, but it is imperfect since it has failed to guarantee equal representation of all 
citizens.83 Following Dahl’s concept, Costa Rica progressively fulfilled all the conditions 
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to become a polyarchy.84 Also, in line with Dahl’s requisites, by 1975 Costa Rica’s 
political system reached an absolute democratic regime, by eliminating the second 
paragraph of article 98 of the Political Constitution, prohibiting the formation or operation 
of “anti-democratic” parties. The elimination of this paragraph opened the possibility for 
any citizen to run for a public office, regardless of their political ideology.85 
 
Figure 8. Dictators in Latin America in the Second Half of the 20th 
Century.86 
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Additionally, two factors played a major role in the Costa Rican democratic 
process: the abolition of the army and the limitation of the scope of the Executive Power.87 
Article 12 of the Political Constitution of 1949 granted Costa Rica one of its most notable 
characteristics worldwide: 
The army as a permanent institution is proscribed. For vigilance and the 
preservation of public order, there will be the necessary police forces. Only 
through continental agreement for the national defense may military forces 
be organized; in either case they shall always be subordinate to the civil 
power; they may not deliberate or make manifestations or declarations in 
individual or collective form.88 
Costa Rica thus became the first country in the world to abolish its army and would 
automatically stand out among Latin American countries, which at the time were struggling 
with authoritarian regimes. Even though the Costa Rican army historically had no major 
power and had been in decline since the 1920s, its abolition made it impossible for coups 
d’état to develop in the country’s political dynamics.89 In addition to bringing political 
stability and being a symbol of political will to create a civil society without armies, the 
abolition of the army allowed Costa Rica to redirect its resources and invested in areas such 
as education, health, and infrastructure (see Figure 9).90 Also, as a long term causal effect 
to the army’s relinquishment and redistribution of public spending, Costa Rica experienced 
an average annual GDP growth rate of 2.44% from 1951 to 2010; previously (1920–1949) 
the annual rate averaged 1.31% per year. 
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Figure 9. Costa Rican Government Expenditures, 1920–1974.91 
The second determining factor for Costa Rican democratic stability was the 
limitation of the Executive Branch powers, which were modified by the 1949 Constitution. 
Along with guaranteeing the political and functional independence of the Judicial Branch, 
the 1949 Constitution imposed a system of counterweights to the Executive Branch, which 
consequently gave greater political stability to the country.  
Among the most relevant changes were the creation of the office of the Comptroller 
General of the Republic, whose objective is to oversee the legality of the administrative 
acts of the public sector, the creation of a decentralized sector of autonomous institutions 
with administrative independence, and the elimination of the power of the President to 
appoint or remove public officials through the creation of the Civil Service Regime. Plus, 
 
91Source: Abarca and Ramırez, 17. 
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the Executive Branch became a collegiate body, which means that the President and the 
appointee ministers must sign the decrees issued.92  
Though presidential regimes are common in most of Latin America, the Costa 
Rican regime also differs from its counterparts in elements such as the high level of 
citizens’ rights and the mechanisms to guarantee their protection. These factors add to the 
polyarchic background and the extensive political, legal, and administrative controls that 
weigh on the Executive Branch.93 That said, the consolidation of the rule of law and the 
balance in the structures of the State collaborated to bolster and stabilize the Costa Rican 
democratic system. Over the years these circumstances have allowed Costa Rica to 
continue taking steps towards the development of mechanisms and institutions that 
guarantee its status as a full democracy, a status in which elements such as human rights, 
freedom, and fair and free elections are fundamental.  
Legislative efforts to consolidate Costa Rica’s democratic status, combined with 
the absence of armies, generated a strong culture of peace among Costa Ricans. Even 
though Costa Rica is immersed in a geopolitical space overwhelmed by a history of coups, 
wars, poverty, and violence, Costa Rica’s political development allowed it to alienate itself 
more successfully from the frameworks of violence experienced in the rest of Central 
America.94 Eventually, a strong sense of respect for the democratic path and civil rights 
permeated society and generated a pacifist identity. Democratic stability and a culture of 
peace also provided less space for the development of political and social unrest, the 
opposite from the violent experiences that have troubled neighboring nations to this day. 
Peacefulness in Costa Rica has transcended its borders and has become one of the country’s 
most recognized qualities worldwide. As an illustration, the Global Peace Index (GPI) in 
2020, published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, found that despite a regional 
 
92 Programa Estado de la Nación, “La larga transición hacia la democracia en Costa Rica,” 121–22. 
93 Jorge Vargas Cullell, Luis Rosero Bixby, and Mitchell A. Seligson, La cultura política de la 
democracia en Costa Rica: 2006 (San José, C.R: Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP) de la Univ. 
de Costa Rica, 2006), 2–3. 
94 Ronald Rivera Alfaro, “Disertaciones Sobre La Cultura de Paz En Costa Rica,” Revista 
Latinoamericana de Derechos Humanos 31, no. 2 (October 6, 2020), https://doi.org/10.15359/rldh.31-2.3. 
31 
deterioration of 1.2% in the peace ranking, Costa Rica remains the most peaceful country 
in Central America and the Caribbean and number 32 worldwide (see Table 1).95 
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Notwithstanding the efforts and advances of neighboring nations in terms of 
democratic developments, Costa Rica’s democratic culture allows it to remain an example 
among democratic systems. Yet, given the worldwide decline of democratic indexes, Costa 
Rican democracy faces the challenge of evolving and adapting to the realities of its time to 
meet the needs of its citizens. In the end, democracies will be as durable as their citizens 
allow them to be, especially if their living conditions are met. 
C. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Costa Rica’s early colonial economy did not differ greatly from the rest of Central 
America. The lack of mineral wealth and the geographic dimension led the Central 
American countries to have economies substantially dependent on trade; therefore, it led 
them to specialize in agricultural exports such as coffee and bananas.97 After the arrival of 
Independence in 1821, Costa Rica endorsed policies to promote the coffee-growing and 
exporting practices adopted in the colony. Among the new policies that allowed the coffee 
industry to flourish were the concession of land and the distribution of coffee plants to 
farmers interested in its production. The early 19th century brought a coffee boom to Costa 
Rica that boosted the economic and social growth of the country; hence the “Golden Bean” 
became one of the main economic engines of Costa Rica.98 
The commercial relationship with England was a key part in catapulting the success 
of Costa Rican coffee exports. England’s interest in the trans-isthmian route and in the 
acquisition of goods in Central America led it to discover the quality of Costa Rican coffee, 
for which they were willing to pay more if necessary.99 Meanwhile, the abuses of power 
over land distribution in countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala delayed the 
development of their coffee industry, which consequently benefited Costa Rica’s 
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monoculture economy and allowed Costa Rican coffee to have a better position in the 
commercial market and its production to occupy the focus of the authorities and elites.100 
The consolidation of the agro-export economy based on coffee started a process of 
transformation in the social classes, institutions, and infrastructure of the country. The 
emerging coffee grower elite, in addition to having high participation in political life, 
financed new producers and traders, which led to circumstances that eventually triggered 
the creation of the first banks in the 1860s and the proliferation of new industries, such as 
the banana enclave.101 However, the economic recession of the coffee market at the end 
of the 19th century, together with the crises in exports and imports, fiscal deficit, and 
inflation at the beginning of the 19th century, developed a strong political polarization that 
led to the 1948 revolution in Costa Rica.102 Yet, by comparison, Costa Rica had better 
living and economic conditions overall, with a per capita income twice that of the rest of 
Central America.103 
Following the 1948 Revolution, and with the new political system in place, Costa 
Rica began to go through a strong process of social inclusion, which led to an improvement 
in the living conditions of the population. From the beginning of the second half of the 20th 
century, social inequality in the country decreased, as a larger part of the population 
benefited from the economic and social development that was taking place. Through 
universal social policies, increased public social spending, and high rates of economic 
growth, the country was able to ensure that most of its population achieved the conditions 
of citizen empowerment. These imposed reforms promoted economic and social 
development never seen before in Costa Rica. The income per capita experienced an 
important growth, the poverty level dropped by 50%, and the people with access to the 
social security system grew exponentially, in turn leading to an improvement in mortality 
rates.104  
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As noted above, with the abolition of the army, there was a substantial saving of 
economic resources, which could be allocated to more productive sectors that were more 
important for the country’s development model.105 During the first three decades 
following the abolition of the army, spending on infrastructure, health and education 
increased from 2.6% to 13.4% of Costa Rica’s GDP. The creation of the Costa Rican 
Electricity Institute was among the most significant institutional changes, increasing 
electricity generation and coverage by 15 times compared to the first half of the 20th 
century. Education-wise, from 1920 to 1949, total government spending on education 
represented 15%, and by 1969 it reached almost 35% of total spending. The dynamics of 
reallocation of spending allowed the country to go from 884 primary schools in 1949 to 
2,610 schools by 1974, thus significantly reducing illiteracy rates.106  
On top of resource investment, the Political Constitution guarantees that no less 
than 6% of the GDP be invested in education and establishes mandatory and free preschool 
and general basic education.107 Therefore, access to education became universal and Costa 
Rica became one of the most literate countries in Latin America. By 2018, 97.9% of Costa 
Ricans over 15 years old can read and write. In comparison, Guatemala, Panama, and 
Nicaragua have public expenditures on education below 4% and register literacy levels of 
81.5%, 87.2%, and 95.4%, respectively (see Figure 10).108 
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Figure 10. Central America and The Caribbean Literacy Percentages.109 
Even though the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) highlights 
Costa Rica among the highest levels for its quality of life and policies, it warns of the 
challenges the country faces in areas such as poverty and unemployment.110 Likewise, as 
pointed out by the CIA’s World Factbook, Costa Rica has enjoyed stable economic growth 
since 2010 and has even managed to expand its portfolio of export goods and tourism 
services. Nonetheless, the poverty level has been above 20% in the last 20 years, and the 
growth of public debt and the fiscal deficit weaken the government’s finances and the 
country’s economic stability.111 In this scenario, Costa Rica is lagging behind the 
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economies of Guatemala and Panama, which by 2019 recorded an average GDP growth of 
3.6%.  
Among the range of causes pointed out for undermining the country’s economy are 
an irresponsible increase in public spending, low levels of competitiveness, drug 
trafficking, corruption, and growing levels of insecurity.112 The growing levels of 
insecurity besides affecting the security of the social collective, directly threatens the image 
of a peaceful, safe, and paradisiacal nation that promotes tourism in the country. Tourism 
is an important engine for Costa Rica’s economy and the generation of jobs; for example, 
in 2016 alone, the tourism industry generated 211,000 direct jobs and had a contribution 
of 6.3% of the GDP. To gauge the importance of the tourism industry’s contributions, in 
the same period, the banana industry only contributed 1.1% of GDP.113 
The U.S. State Department’s decision to modify the travel advisory category for 
Costa Rica reflects the increase in crime rates in the country. According to U.S. authorities, 
the level of danger faced by tourists when visiting Costa Rica went from category 1, which 
instructs travelers to take normal precautions, to category 2, which warns that they should 
take extra caution if they decide to visit the country.114 The sum of these circumstances 
has created social unrest, where citizens demand more efficiency from their governments 
and provide greater economic harmony to the country. Failing to take positive actions 
jeopardizes the citizenry’s support of the government; consequently, jeopardizes the 
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III. DRUG TRAFFICKING THREAT: DEMOCRACY AT STAKE 
“Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of  
corrosive effects on societies.” 
—Kofi A. Annan, United Nations Convention against Corruption 
 
Drug trafficking represents a constant threat to the state and the society it 
represents.115 In its struggle to expand and survive, drug trafficking seeks to insert itself 
into the social fabric of a nation, and corruption is one of its tools. Therefore, drug 
trafficking expansion, in addition to threatening the security and health of a country, 
jeopardizes its governance, particularly when it comes to democracy.  
In its quest to expand its markets and fight opposition from the authorities, drug 
traffickers seek to permeate and form relationships with state structures. In turn, political 
power offers drug traffickers spaces to circumvent the law and guarantee security for their 
illicit activities. This collusion between the interests of political power and drug trafficking 
weakens state institutions and democracy, creating uncertainty among the population and 
its legislators, calling governance into question.116 This chapter describes the wake of drug 
trafficking in the Costa Rican state and its impact on its democracy and institutions. Both 
factors are fundamental towards Costa Rica’s exceptional quality. 
A. NARCO-POLITICS  
Drug trafficking and related activities are a latent threat to a nation’s political 
system. Kofi Annan began the forward of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption with the words “Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of 
corrosive effects on societies,” hinting at the vulnerability of countries to this 
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phenomenon.117Among the corrosive effects referred to by Kofi Annan is the capacity of 
corruption to undermine democracy and the rule of law.118  
Although the phenomenon of corruption is not exclusive to criminal organizations, 
the illicit nature of criminal organizations such as drug trafficking networks leads them to 
use corruption as a mechanism to fight against legality. With almost inestimable annual 
revenues, bribes and corruption are just one more item on the payroll of criminal 
organizations. Drug traffickers have the means to afford corruption at all levels regardless 
of territorial boundaries, as long as they can expand their operations and resist opposition 
from the authorities (see Figure 11).119 The economic flexibility and power that drug 
traffickers possess allow them to corrupt and form a symbiosis with a country’s political 
sphere. Meanwhile, this complicity with the political scheme offers drug traffickers the 
opportunity to cut corners with the law in pursuit of their “business” objectives. 
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Figure 11. Sectors Vulnerable to Corruption.120 
The political scene in Costa Rica has not escaped the corruption that accompanied 
the expansion of drug trafficking in the country. The first signs of drug trafficking 
infiltration among the Costa Rican political class date back to 1985, with the arrest of drug 
trafficker Caro Quintero.121 In April 1985, inside his mansion called “La Quinta,” Costa 
Rican authorities arrested Rafael Caro Quintero, a Mexican drug lord and co-founder of 
the Guadalajara Cartel. At the time of his arrest, Quintero was on the run from Mexican 
authorities after being charged with the murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) agent.122 
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The arrest of Caro Quintero raised suspicions among Costa Rican authorities, who 
questioned who had facilitated the Mexican drug lord’s entry and stay in the country. These 
doubts led to the creation of the first legislative commission on drug trafficking, dedicated 
to investigating the evidence that pointed to links with the drug lord’s network.123 Finally, 
the special commission’s investigation corroborated the existence of relationships between 
high-ranking politicians and the drug trafficker. These officials allegedly facilitated the 
entry of Quintero and his entourage into Costa Rica.124 Although his involvement has not 
been confirmed, the press speculated that former Costa Rican President Daniel Oduber was 
the higher authority who made it possible for the drug trafficker to enter the country.125 
Author and historian Mercedes Muñoz recognizes that the Quintero case awakened 
interest in the links between politicians and drug trafficking; however, Muñoz states that it 
was not until 1987, because of the “Alem case,” that the issue generated greater interest 
due to its electoral implications.126 As a result of a series of reports in the Costa Rican 
newspaper La Nación, the first case of money laundering in the country at the hands of 
Ricardo Alem León became known. During this period, Alem, besides being Costa Rica’s 
representative before the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, was one of the 
heads of the National Liberation Political Party during the electoral campaign of the pre-
candidate Rolando Araya. Alem’s actions, facilitated by his political position, not only 
sunk Araya’s political pretensions but also tarnished the image of the political party.127 
Besides laundering money from Colombian drug cartels, it was later proven that Alem was 
also the local leader of an international drug trafficking network.128 
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The press accusations, coupled with Costa Rican speculation, led to the designation 
of a second special commission on drug trafficking by the Legislative Assembly.129 The 
commission’s reports confirmed once again the nexus between drug trafficking networks 
and the Costa Rican political sphere.130 Among the accusations were political personalities 
of the decade, such as judicial officials, deputies, magistrates, presidential candidates, the 
minister of security, and the former president of the Republic, Daniel Oduber. The 
commission’s findings were overwhelming and changed public opinion of political figures 
and parties since it confirmed the irruption of drug trafficking in the three branches of 
government. On the findings, Muñoz noted, “In other words, by mid-1989 it was already 
public and notorious that narco-politics had set its nets in the Costa Rican political 
arena.”131 Consequently, the credibility of Costa Ricans in the political class, political 
parties, and state powers decreased.  
While these events impacted the Costa Rican political climate in the following 
years, drug-related corruption cases did not diminish. The nineties brought new cases of 
narco-politics. By 1997, the names of former President Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier 
and then-presidential candidate Miguel Angel Rodriguez were negatively associated with 
Mexican businessman Carlos Hank Gonzalez. By then, the DEA was investigating Hank 
for drug trafficking and money laundering.132 For Calderón, it was the second time he was 
associated with campaign contributions from drug money. During his presidential 
candidacy in the late 1980s for the Social Christian Unity Party, Rafael Angel Calderon 
was accused of receiving campaign contributions from Panamanian General Manuel 
Antonio Noriega Moreno, who was known for his ties to the drug trade.133 Attempting to 
sway the outcome of elections is one of the activities of criminal organizations in order to 
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secure their alliances. By definition, this activity is highly corrupt and threatens the state 
by interfering in its democratic processes.134 
In the new century, scandals and links between politicians and drug trafficking 
continue to grow hand-in-hand with drug trafficking. In 2013, President Laura Chinchilla 
made headlines accompanied by the phrase “Narco-avioneta” (narco-jet). Chinchilla was 
accused of making two free international trips in an aircraft owned by Colombian Gabriel 
Morales Fallón, who is in turn associated with Colombian drug trafficker Carlos Ramírez 
Abadía, alias “Chupeta.”135 These flights raised suspicions of her possible involvement 
with criminal networks. Despite the fact that the former president was emphatic in not 
having any link to either of the two subjects, Chinchilla’s political credibility was affected, 
along with the public’s confidence in her government. 
More recently, a report by the Organized Crime Section of the Judicial Investigation 
Organization (OIJ) indicates that drug trafficking has permeated the courts in the city of 
Golfito in Costa Rica. As a result of the investigation carried out by this section during 
2019 and 2020, a judge and a judicial technician were arrested after evidence was found of 
their alleged links to drug trafficking.136 On December 2020, the OIJ arrested a second 
judge and a Costa Rican police officer, alongside 16 other people, for allegedly working 
for an international drug network.137 These cases, far from creating accusations or fact 
affirmations, showcase the spiral of corruption cases associated with drug trafficking in 
lower and higher levels of power, which cyclically monopolize Costa Rican media and 
public opinion.  
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As drug trafficking grows, so does corruption and its effects. Total drug seizures in 
recent years have increased in Costa Rica, reaching all-time highs in 2020 with the seizure 
of more than 19 tons of cocaine.138 Unfortunately, the increase in drug trafficking in the 
territory is accompanied by an increase in corruption. Based on statistics from Costa Rica’s 
Deputy Prosecutor’s Office for Probity, Transparency and Anti-Corruption, between 2015 
and 2020, complaints of corruption in the public service sector have increased fivefold. As 
stated by Attorney General Emilia Navas, most of the cases prosecuted “are of a very 
complex nature and have a very high impact on the country’s development.”139  
Drug trafficking and corruption feed off each other, becoming more deeply rooted 
in a country’s institutions. The UNODC World Drug Report 2017 describes the symbiosis 
between the two illegal activities in simple terms: “Corruption facilitates the production 
and trafficking of illegal drugs and this, in turn, benefits corruption.”140 Thus, UNODC 
shows the vulnerability of the democratic system to the corrosive force of drug trafficking 
at all levels of governance, especially if conditions of political instability develop that 
generate a power vacuum in favor of drug traffickers.141  
When it comes to corruption, as shown by the 2020 Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) compiled by Transparency International, so far Costa Rica remains among the least 
corrupt countries in Latin America (see Figure 12).142 Yet, the CPI report results show that 
since its 2018 drop in the ranking, Costa Rica has not made significant progress in the fight 
against corruption. Plus, as the 2020 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
warns, “The growing presence of transnational criminal organizations and rising corruption 
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in all security services is a chief concern.”143 In other words, the U.S. Department of State 
draws attention to the latent threat of drug trafficking to which the country is exposed 
through the growth of drug trafficking networks. 
 
Figure 12. Corruption Perception Index 2020.144 
To tackle corruption, the country has also implemented public policies to promote 
government transparency, accountability, and access to public information. These public 
policies add up to the regulations of Law No. 8422 against Corruption and Illicit 
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Enrichment in the Public Service and the Law No. 9699 Responsibility of Legal Persons 
on Domestic Bribery, International Bribery, and Other Crimes.145 With these policies, the 
hope is to combat impunity and corruption and to minimize the effects that corruption 
generates, such as the weakening of institutions and law enforcement bodies, as well as the 
questioning of their capacity to contain crime.146 All in all, corruption has the effect of 
weakening political systems, particularly democratic ones, which is why it is important to 
contain it. 
B. DRUG MONEY  
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes “the illicit drug trade fuels 
corruption that weakens institutions, erodes public confidence in the rule of law, and in 
some cases, leads to political instability and unrest.”147 Beyond corruption, the expansion 
of drug trafficking undercuts democracy through its intrusion into a nation’s economy. 
Organized crime activities are lucrative in nature; however, due to the illegal nature of their 
enterprise, they need to introduce their profits into a nation’s economic flows. 
Money laundering, or the legitimization of capital, forms an integral part of the 
drug traffickers agenda to legitimize their profits. Article b.1 of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances refers to 
money laundering:  
The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from any offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph a) of this paragraph, or from an act of participation in such 
offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit 
origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the 
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commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences 
of his actions.148 
Furthermore, the United Nations identifies placement, layering, and integration as 
the three stages of the money laundering process within an economy (see Figure 13). 
Likewise, worldwide the United Nations estimates the amount of money laundered 
annually in the world may be as high as $2 trillion (USD).149 
 
Figure 13. Money Laundering Cycle.150 
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Acquisitions of luxury goods, investment in real estate or money-generating 
businesses such as casinos, hotels, or restaurants, as well as investment in offshore centers, 
are some of the most common practices in the integration phase. With the aim of facilitating 
this and the rest of the stages in the money laundering process, professionals such as 
accountants and lawyers are part of the structure of drug trafficking networks.151 
The Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) of the Costa Rican Drug Institute identified 
at least 34 typologies in the country used for money laundering between 2018 and 2019. 
These typologies are the product of cases detected, through investigations and suspicious 
transaction reports (STR) generated by various national and international entities, but 
mostly by the banking sector. Some of the typologies include loans and extortion, 
remittances, and international transfers of high volume and without links to the sender, 
financing of political parties, sports betting, and the proliferation of retail businesses.152 
Moreover, UIF records for 2020 reported a total of 550 suspicious transactions for a total 
time of $347,927,652, representing an increase of 20% in relation to the reports of 2019. 
Of the 550 cases registered, 226 were sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office to generate the 
opening of a criminal case and determine whether there is an illicit origin of the money 
flow.153 
Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 statutes, those countries “whose financial 
institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from 
international narcotics trafficking” will be considered major money laundering 
countries.154 Following this concept, the 2020 Money Laundering volume of the 2020 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report included Costa Rica in this category list of 
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major money laundering countries.155 While the report also recognizes Costa Rica’s efforts 
and cooperation to prevent this criminal modality, it warns of the legal vacuums and lack 
of control mechanisms fostered by the current legislation. These vacuums attract organized 
crime by offering them an advantage for money laundering. For instance, it mentions the 
high flow of migrants and tourists crossing borders as vulnerable points for money 
smuggling.156 
Costa Rica is not yet considered a financial hub or tax haven, but when money 
laundering is inserted into a country, it has a detrimental effect on its economy, security, 
and society. Some of the negative effects of money laundering activities are its potential to 
destabilize the integrity of financial institutions and affect currencies and interest rates.157 
John McDowell argues money laundering also affects state coffers through tax evasion and 
tax fraud, impacting the government’s ability to respond to the needs of the nation. Direct 
impact on the national budget has implications for institutions, social security, and the 
quality of life in general. Additionally, the detrimental economic and social conditions of 
the country can also discourage foreign investment, negatively impacting production, and 
employment rates.  
Money laundering also serves as a fuel for corruption which, as mentioned above, 
is a tool for drug trafficking and the maintenance of its operations. Hence, money 
laundering and corruption have become a vital process to nurture the operations of drug 
traffickers, increasing their power across a nation. As the hand of drug trafficking grows 
in society, government expenditures in areas such as security and health must be bolstered, 
destabilizing public spending.158 In short, drug trafficking and its related activities have 
an overwhelming potential to undermine the stability of a political system. Therefore, 
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IV. DRUG TRAFFICKING THREAT: DRUG, VIOLENCE AND 
CAPABILITIES 
One of the more striking features of the global community today is that a large number of 
people around the world feel increasingly “insecure.” 
—Hugo Frühling, Joseph Tulchin, and Heather Golding,  
Crime and Violence in Latin America 
 
When compared to its sister Central American nations, Costa Rica has stood out for 
having a tradition of peace, security, and non-violence. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance 
speech, former President Oscar Arias Sanchez extolled Costa Rica’s pacifist character by 
proclaiming “When you decided to honor me with this prize, you decided to honor a 
country of peace, you decided to honor Costa Rica.”159 Unfortunately, the growing 
organized crime and violence throughout Central America threaten Costa Rica’s peaceful 
image. 
For many years Costa Rica served only as a transshipment point for drug cartels; 
still, the continued expansion of drug trafficking operations has transformed this reality. 
As acknowledged by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
“the drug trade in Costa Rica has morphed into a proliferation of illegal air tracks, 
warehousing operations, land smuggling networks, tainted fishing vessels, and suspect 
shipping container traffic.”160  
Drug trafficking proliferation in the country has also brought about an increase in 
violence rates and levels of insecurity. This chapter focuses on analyzing the evolution of 
drug trafficking in Costa Rica and its trail of violence, as well as the state’s response and 
capacities to combat drug trafficking.  
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A. DRUG TRAFFICKING AND CRIME INCREASE 
Geographically located between the main producers and consumers of drugs, 
Central America is vulnerable to the war on drugs.161 According to Bruce Bagley, Latin 
American political leaders point out that if Americans did not demand a high production 
of drugs for their consumption, drug trafficking would not dominate Latin America.162 
While drug use is not a phenomenon exclusive to the United States, Bagley acknowledges 
that for decades, the U.S. has been one of the world’s leading drug consumers. An echo of 
this view is the UNODC’s 2020 report on drug use, which highlights the United States and 
Western and Central Europe as the main markets for cocaine consumption with a 
prevalence of 2.1% and 1.4%, respectively (see Figure 14).163 The report also estimated 
the former had 5.5 million cocaine users in 2018 alone. 
 
Figure 14. World Annual Prevalence of Cocaine Use164 
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Former President Richard Nixon declared illegal drugs as the number one public 
enemy of the United States, in light of the evident increase in drug use in the country.165 
Since then, U.S. anti-drug policies have focused on reducing international drug trafficking 
to North America, seeking to affect the availability and demand for drugs in U.S. territory. 
This strategy combats drug trafficking domestically, but also assists foreign governments 
with interdiction strategies and dismantling criminal organizations.166 For example, the 
United States provides monetary and military aid to South America with the aim of 
eradicating or reducing cocaine production in the region, given its position as the world’s 
leading supplier.167 The United States also supports the Mexican government in the control 
and mitigation of drug cartels and the violence generated by them. 
With an approximate cost of $1 trillion dollars, the fact is that the War on Drugs—
declared more than 40 years ago—has not succeeded in reducing drug trafficking into the 
United States and abroad.168 Instead, prohibitionist and control policies have been 
counterproductive to the ends they were to serve. Simple proof of the failure of policies, as 
mentioned above, is the leading position of the United States in relation to drug use. 
Associated with the increase in drug use, the escalation of drug overdose deaths is also 
noticeable (see Figure 15).169 Christopher Coyne and Abigail Hall summarize this failure 
with strongly worded opinions “The U.S. War on Drugs…is a prime example of disastrous 
policy, naked self-interest, and repeated ignorance on the part of elected officials and other 
policymakers. From its inception, the drug war has repeatedly led to waste, fraud, 
corruption, violence, and death.”170  
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Figure 15. U.S. Drug-Involved Overdose Deaths 1999–2019171 
The failure of the U.S. War on Drugs did not stop at its American borders. On the 
contrary, it is accused of having a spillover effect on drug trafficking in Latin America.172 
For example, the policies of fumigation and eradication of cocaine plantations in Colombia 
led to the proliferation of coca leaf cultivation in Bolivia and Peru. In Mexico, the 
oppression of drug cartels has encouraged the displacement of their operations to Central 
America.173 Such phenomena linked to the illegal drug trade are popularly known in the 
literature as the “balloon effect” and the “cockroach/diaspora effect.”174 
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The “balloon effect” refers to the displacement effect generated by authorities 
imposing pressure on criminal activities at a specific point.175 Stella Rouse and Moises 
Arce summarize it as “As the analogy to a balloon implies, government and law 
enforcement efforts represent the ‘squeezing’ of a balloon; showing an immediate effect in 
contracting the balloon walls, but creating an increase in illegal activity at the ends of the 
balloon, that is, areas that are not being extensively targeted by law enforcement.”176 The 
cockroach/diaspora effect is seen as the migration of criminal structures to different 
locations, as a survival strategy for their operations to avoid detection by the authorities.177 
Juan Garzón and John Bailey also identify the “butterfly effect” and the “short-
sheet effect” as part of the phenomena of displacement of drug trafficking to Latin 
America.178 The “butterfly effect” is described as the repercussion of an action taken in an 
area or country other than the one in which it was carried out. The “short-sheet effect” is 
the result of the budgetary limitations of the countries for the attention of priorities. The 
authors explain that budgetary constraints force countries with limited resources to follow 
the anti-drug policies of countries with greater resources, resulting in the need for 
cooperation between the United States and Latin America in the fight against drug 
trafficking.179 The four phenomena are also associated with the potential for secondary 
negative effects such as the increase in drug consumption, the emergence of local drug 
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Until the 1980s, Costa Rica was not a land of great relevance for drug cartels, yet 
U.S. anti-drug policy changed this panorama.181 Central America is no longer just a 
passage route for drug traffickers, but a strategic location for their illicit activities. The 
effects of the U.S., Mexican, and South American anti-drug efforts have led to a shift in 
drug trafficking routes, pushing them to areas of less resistance for their operations. As 
noted by former U.S. President Barack Obama, “As Mexico and Colombia continue to 
apply pressure on drug traffickers, the countries of Central America are increasingly 
targeted for trafficking of cocaine and other drugs primarily destined for the United 
States.”182 The expansion of drug trafficking in Central America has not spared Costa 
Rica; instead, it is at the heart of the new illegal drug trafficking routes, by air, sea, and 
land (see Figure 16).  
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Figure 16. Drug Trafficking Routes Detected by Costa Rican Authorities.183  
The transformation of Costa Rica as a pivotal location for drug cartels has placed it 
on the U.S. blacklist as a major drug transit country.184 According to section 706 Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, since 2009 Costa Rica has qualified as a 
drug-transit country “that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic 
drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or through 
which are transported such drugs or substances.”185 The large flow of drugs along Costa 
Rica’s coasts and territory is also reflected in the frequency and size of seizures; for 
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example, in 1990 cocaine seizures totaled 848 kilos, a much lower figure compared to the 
31,132 kilos of cocaine seized in 2019.186 In 2020, Costa Rica reached historical records 
with the seizure of 56.7 tons of cocaine and 14.4 tons of marijuana. These numbers 
represent an increase of 54% in relation to the total seizures reported during 2019.187 
Not only has Costa Rica’s role been transformed by the increased flow of drugs 
into its territory, but also by the proliferation of drug trafficking networks, warehouses, and 
illegal airstrips, among other illegal operations.188 Based on statistics from the Costa Rican 
Drug Control Police (PCD), by 2018, there were already around 127 legal airstrips and 83 
clandestine airstrips used by drug traffickers for loading and unloading drugs, or as a 
refueling point for aircraft.189 Likewise, for this same year, the PCD reported the 
disruption of 144 drug trafficking networks, followed by 121 organizations during 2019, 
of which 19 corresponded to international organizations.190 These numbers, in addition to 
showing the work of the authorities, reveal the extent and speed with which these criminal 
organizations are spreading in the country.  
Whereas in previous decades, the major source of crime in Costa Rica was 
associated with property crimes, the globalization of organized crime has become the 
driving force behind the country’s crime rate.191 The explosion of criminal organizations 
presents a challenge to Costa Rican authorities, not only because of their illegal operations 
but also because of the violence that accompanies them. Marcelo Bergman argues that one 
of the biggest threats posed by drug trafficking is the “diversification of criminals involved 
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in the business.”192 Beyond providing protection and logistical support to cartel 
operations, the gangs that make up these structures carry out parallel activities with the 
same levels of violence, such as assaults, robberies, extortive loans, and struggles for 
territorial control.193 In this regard, Bergman warns of the need for countries to take 
prompt and effective action against drug trafficking and the violence of its operations 
before its expansion has a higher cost.194 
According to reports from the Judicial Investigation Organism (OIJ), drug 
trafficking ranked as the most violent crime in the country in 2018 and also as the culprit 
behind the increase in other crimes such as homicides, extortion, and kidnappings.195 
Although Costa Rica remains one of the least violent countries in Central America, the 
progressive increase in homicide cases reached record levels during 2017, with a rate of 
12.1% of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, equivalent to a total of 603 cases (see  
Figure 17).196 The OIJ, states that the increase in homicide cases in Costa Rica is directly 
associated with the criminal activities of drug cartels. The “settling of scores” linked to 
non-payment of merchandise, loss or theft of drugs, and territorial fights, emerge as the 
most common modality in homicide cases.197  
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Figure 17. Victims of Intentional Homicide, 1990–2018.198 
Hugo Frühling et al. claim “One of the most striking features of the global 
community today is that large numbers of people around the world feel increasingly 
insecure.”199 The rise of violence in Costa Rica, on top of increasing the feeling of 
insecurity described by Frühling et al., places the country’s stability at high risk.200 
Organized crime and violence have a high potential to weaken the governance of countries, 
not only because of their direct effects on society but also because of their impact on the 
national economy. Some of the most perceptible economic damages are the limitation of 
productivity and development, the loss of investments and jobs, and the redirection of 
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public spending to address crime.201 Hence, understanding why the growth of violence has 
intensified CR’s fight against drug trafficking is important.202  
B. STATE AGAINST NARCOTRAFFIC 
Drug trafficking expansion and its harmful effects on society and institutions 
require a state response to combat it. In the case of Costa Rica, the strategies of its fight 
against drug trafficking revolve around the creation of regulations, institutions, and the 
formulation of international agreements. The foundations of Costa Rica’s fight against 
drugs date back to the 1970s with the approval of the 1961 Single Convention on Drugs 
and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.203 These norms’ objectives are 
summarized in the need to combat the illegal use of psychotropic substances, and the need 
to establish regulations to prevent the illegal trafficking of these substances.204 
Additionally, the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances served as the basis for Costa Rica’s regulatory framework to 
punish illegal drug trafficking.205 
In compliance with the provisions of the aforementioned conventions, the General 
Health Law created in 1973 was the first to introduce regulations on the use and production 
of illegal drugs. Article 127 of this law established the explicit prohibition of the 
“cultivation, import, export, traffic and use of cannabis, coca, and opium poppy, as well as 
their seeds when they have germinating capacity.”206 Later on, with the increasing activity 
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of drug traffickers in the country, Costa Rican Legislative Assembly passed Law No. 7093 
in 1988, known as the Law on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs for 
Unauthorized Use, and Related Activities.207  
In accordance with Article 1, the objective of the Law No. 7093 is “to regulate the 
prevention, supply, prescription, administration, handling, use, possession, trafficking, and 
commercialization of narcotic drugs, psychotropic drugs, inhalants, and other drugs and 
medicines susceptible of producing physical or psychological dependencies, included in 
the Single Convention.”208 The approval of this law also enabled the Costa Rican 
government to allocate resources to the fight against drug trafficking.209 Furthermore, with 
the evolution of drug trafficking in Costa Rica, since its approval in 1988, the law has 
undergone multiple reforms for the incorporation of new regulations, going from fifty-one 
articles to one hundred and sixty-six articles in its last version in 2001, under Law No. 
8204, which has the same name of its original version.210 In 2009, substantive amendments 
were made to this body of law with the creation of the Law No. 8754 Against Organized 
Crime, which, in other matters, authorizes the intervention of communications in 
investigations related to illegal drug trafficking in Article 16.211 
The new legislation on psychotropic substances, beyond regulating illegal drug 
trafficking, also established the delegation of functions and the creation of institutions to 
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oversee the fulfillment of regulations in this matter.212 Thus, at the end of the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s, Costa Rica created the National Drug Council (CONADRO) 
responsible for planning and dictating drug policies; the Joint Anti-Drug Intelligence 
Center (CICAD), responsible for repressive matters and public security at the national and 
international level; and the Institute of Alcoholism and Drug Dependency (IAFA) was 
delegated the preventive and health aspects.213 With the creation of CONADRO, the first 
national plans and anti-drug policies were established in the country, which determined the 
first in the prevention and the fight against drugs. These functions were later assumed by 
the National Center for Drug Prevention (CENADRO), a center that also became 
responsible for the custody and administration of goods and money coming from the 
seizures made under the law of psychotropic drugs.214 
In 2002, in parallel with aligning with U.S. policies on money laundering and drug 
trafficking, the new Law No. 8204 created the Costa Rican Drug Institute (ICD).215 The 
law stipulates, inter alia, that the ICD assumes the assets and functions performed by 
CENADRO and CICAD. Therefore, since its entry in force and to date, the ICD is 
responsible for “coordinating, designing, and implementing policies, plans, and strategies 
for the prevention of drug use, treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration of drug addicts, 
as well as policies, plans, and strategies against illicit drug trafficking, the legitimization 
of capital derived from drug trafficking, related activities, and serious crimes.”216 
In the execution of public policies designed by the ICD to combat illicit drug 
trafficking, Costa Rica’s police forces are a priority for their implementation. As stipulated 
by Article 16 of the Costa Rican Constitution of 1949, with the permanent proscription of 
the army, the surveillance and maintenance of the nation’s public order falls on the police 
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forces.217 In this sense, under the aegis of the Ministry of Public Security and in accordance 
with the powers provided by the General Police Law No. 7410, the Public Force, the Air 
Surveillance Service, the Border Police, the National Coast Guard Service, and the Drug 
Control Police are active in operations against drug trafficking. With the exception of the 
other police bodies mentioned previously, the Drug Control Police, created in 1994, has 
the sole purpose of “preventing punishable acts, contemplated in the legislation on 
narcotics, psychotropic substances, drugs of unauthorized use and related activities, and 
cooperating with the repression of these crimes” according to the provisions of the law.218 
In the fight against drug trafficking at the national level, other institutions that stand 
out are the Judicial Investigation Organism as an auxiliary organ of the Costa Rican Courts 
of Justice, and its Narcotics Section, created in 1977 to investigate national and 
international drug trafficking.219 From the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Drug 
Trafficking Prosecutor’s Office, created in 1989, supervises, controls, and directs drug 
trafficking cases, working jointly with the Drug Control Police and the Judicial 
Investigation Organism.220 Within this framework of the fight against drugs, the National 
Intelligence and Security Directorate (DIS) plays a coordinating role at the national and 
international level in external security matters, working hand in hand with police 
institutions in the event of a crime threat and as Costa Rica’s representative in the 
International Anti-Narcotics Network (RIAN).221  
Combined with an average annual investment of $900 million in national security, 
Costa Rica’s strategies for combating organized crime include international 
 
217 Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica, “Constitución Política de Costa Rica,” 
November 7, 1949, https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/CostaRica/Leyes/constitucion.pdf. 
218 Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica, “Ley General de Policía N° 7410,” May 22, 
1994, http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/
nrm_texto_completo.aspx?nValor1=1&nValor2=66525. 
219 ICD and UNODC, “Estrategia País Para El Fortalecimiento Institucional En La Interdicción de 
Drogas y Precursores Químicos En Costa Rica,” 13. 
220 Bolaños Pérez, “El estado costarricense frente al narcotráfico,” 71. 
221 ICD and UNODC, “Estrategia País Para El Fortalecimiento Institucional En La Interdicción de 
Drogas y Precursores Químicos En Costa Rica,” 13. 
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cooperation.222 The United Nations (UN) argues that the globalization of organized crime 
activities has created a need to strengthen all forms of international cooperation.223 
Furthermore, the UN argues that international cooperation is a necessity to keep pace with 
the advancements of organized crime. The strength with which drug trafficking expands 
its activities and the growing interest of drug cartels in Costa Rica’s strategic location and 
geography compels authorities to seek international assistance.224 In this context, Costa 
Rica has formed several strategic security alliances with international governments, 
seeking to intensify efforts to counteract the evolution of organized crime and its harmful 
effects on society (see Table 3). 
 
 
222 Global Security, “Costa Rica - Military Spending,” accessed April 29, 2021, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/centam/cr-budget.htm. 
223 United Nations, “Combating Transnational Organized Crime Through Better International 
Cooperation,” April 2015, 1. 
224 ICD and UNODC, “Estrategia País Para El Fortalecimiento Institucional En La Interdicción de 
Drogas y Precursores Químicos En Costa Rica,” 17–18. 
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United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 
1988 
Cooperation Agreement with the United States of Mexico to Combat Drug 
Trafficking and Drug Dependence 
1989 
Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Eradication of Illicit Drug 
Trafficking (OAS) 
1990 
Agreement with Colombia on the Prevention, Control, Prosecution and 
Repression of the Abuse of and Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors and Specific Chemicals 
1991 
Agreement with Jamaica to Combat Drug Trafficking and Drug Dependence 1992 
Agreement with Chile on the Prevention, Control, Control and Suppression 
of the Abuse of and Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances and their Precursors and Chemicals 
1992 
Agreement with Argentina on Mutual Legal Assistance against Illicit Drug 
Trafficking 
1992 
Framework Treaty for Democratic Security in Central America (SICA) 1995 
Agreement between Central America and the Dominican Republic on Drugs 
and Money Laundering, Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering 
Crimes, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses 
1997 
Central American Convention for the Prevention of Money Laundering and 
the Laundering of Assets related to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related 
Offenses (SICA) 
1997 
Cooperation Agreement for the Fight against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Related Offenses signed with 
Paraguay 
1997 
Cooperation Agreement with the United States to Suppress Illicit Drug 
Trafficking 
1998 
Agreement with Peru to Combat Drug Abuse, Production and Illicit 
Trafficking of Drugs 
1999 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2001 
Agreement with Panama on the Exchange of Financial Information Relating 
to Money Laundering 
2001 
Agreement with Argentina on Mutual Legal Assistance against Illicit Drug 
Trafficking 
2008 
Cooperation Agreement for Central American Regional Security Initiative 
(CARSI) 
2009 
Agreement between Costa Rica, Colombia, and United States to 
to develop the Sowing Security Strategy 
2018 
Security Cooperation Agreement with Panama   2018 
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Through international cooperation alliances, Costa Rica’s fight against drug 
trafficking has benefited not only financially, but also technically. For example, Costa Rica 
received assistance from the Merida Initiative launched by the administration of former 
U.S. President George Bush in 2007 to combat drug trafficking.225 The Merida Initiative, 
or Plan Merida, with an aid fund of $1 billion, seeks to provide Mexican, Central America, 
and Caribbean security forces with opportunities for professionalization, equipment 
purchases, and intelligence assistance.226 Under this initiative, in 2010, the U.S. 
government agreed to provide approximately $9 million in assistance to Costa Rican 
security forces.227  
Likewise, through the Central American Regional Security Initiative, the United 
States financially contributes to Central American countries to reduce crime and violence, 
as well as to strengthen government institutions.228 Resulting from these initiatives, Costa 
Rica has strengthened the level of professionalization of its police forces with training 
programs and improved the investigative and prosecutorial capabilities of the judiciary.229 
Moreover, economic assistance has enabled the country to purchase and upgrade 
equipment for its security forces and strengthen its interdiction capabilities with U.S. 
assistance.230 In this sense, international cooperation becomes essential for Costa Rica’s 
fight against all forms of organized crime, increasing the chances of success in the 
strategies implemented to combat it. Kofi Annan’s words are accurate in this context, when 
 
225 Committee on Foreign Relations, “The Merida Initiative: ‘Guns, Drug and Friends,’” December 
21, 2007, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-110SPRT39644/html/CPRT-110SPRT39644.htm. 
226 Todd Turner, “Crisis in Mexico: Assessing the Merida Initiative and Its Impact on US-Mexican 
Security” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 1, 2009), vi, https://doi.org/
10.21236/ADA539603. 
227 “Costa Rica Recibe Más Ayuda de EE. UU. En Lucha Contra Narcotráfico,” Nacion, accessed 
May 1, 2021, https://www.nacion.com/sucesos/costa-rica-recibe-mas-ayuda-de-ee-uu-en-lucha-contra-
narcotrafico/RUPEJ4ODPJFJVI5SPSEHUQMZOM/story/. 
228 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: United States Support for Central 
American Citizen Security,” whitehouse.gov, May 4, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2013/05/04/fact-sheet-united-states-support-central-american-citizen-security. 
229 U.S. Department of State and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
“International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2019,” 126. 
230 U.S. Department of State and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
124. 
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he stated, “With enhanced international cooperation, we can have a real impact on the 
ability of international criminals to operate successfully and can help citizens everywhere 
in their often bitter struggle for safety and dignity in their homes and communities.”231  
  
 
231 United Nations, “United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto” (2004), iv, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/
TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Costa Rica consolidated exceptionalism through decades of comparison with other 
nations. The first traits of Costa Rica’s exceptional concept date back to colonial times and 
strengthened with the country’s democratic transition. The economic and social progress 
and setbacks that flooded Costa Rica in the 20th century eventually led to the entrenchment 
of the democratic state.232 Yet, the democratic stability achieved does not equate to an 
absence of conflict, but unlike the rest of Latin America, its democracy held firm, even 
amid the convulsive Cold War and political pressures.  
Consistent with the literature reviewed, economic, social, and political 
development emerged as the main precursors of Costa Rica’s exceptional image. The 
political evolution that took place in the country after the Revolution of 1948 established 
new legal mechanisms and the transformation of the structure of the state’s powers. Legal 
changes of this period include the Political Constitution of 1949, which solidified, among 
other aspects, the electoral system, institutional development, and Costa Rican’s civil 
rights. In turn, the improvement in the quality of life of the average Costa Rican, the 
abolition of the army, the absence of war, and democratic stability jump up in juxtaposition 
with the rest of Latin America. These qualities are what give life to and solidify the 
exceptional character of the Costa Rican reality. 
Furthermore, the qualities that have given life to Costa Rica’s exceptionalism have 
succeeded in taking root in the hearts of Ticos and Ticas, making them avid defenders of 
their “uniqueness” and national identity, as well as its main critics. To maintain its 
exceptional status, Costa Rica faces the challenge of continuing to evolve and compete to 
maintain the conditions that differentiate it from the rest of the region.  
The information gathered demonstrates that drug trafficking and its trail of 
criminality defy the characteristics that construct the exceptional Costa Rican identity. The 
illicit nature of drug trafficking, organizations, and activities have proven to have great 
 
232 Programa Estado de la Nación, “La Estabilidad Democrática En La Costa Rica Contemporánea.,” 
Auditoria Ciudadana sobre la Calidad de la Democracia, 2001, 136. 
72 
disruptive capacity in the democratic, economic, and social stability of a country as their 
presence increases in the territory.233 The 1980s marked the onset of the evolution of drug 
trafficking in Costa Rica, linked to the effects of U.S. anti-drug policies and the country’s 
geographic location in relation to drug consumers and suppliers. The same period also 
marks the beginning of the legacy of drug trafficking on the social, institutional, and 
political stability of the Costa Rican state. 
Criminal activities have marked Costa Rica’s emergence as a pivotal logistical 
location for drug trafficking, evidenced by acts such as corruption. Due to the nature of its 
illicit activities, drug trafficking seeks to expand and legitimize its criminal operations. 
Inserting itself into state structures and corruption is one of its tools to achieve this. The 
strength of drug trafficking in Costa Rica has expanded since the 1980s, when the first 
links between the political class and drug cartels were exposed. 
Moreover, as the presence of drug trafficking increases in the country, corruption 
continues to spread from the highest levels of authority to the lowest, seeding itself more 
deeply in Costa Rican institutions. The continuous rising of cases in which Costa Rican 
politicians and authorities have been associated to a greater or lesser extent with drug 
trafficking has lowered citizens’ confidence in their political system and institutions.234 
Although Costa Rica remains among the least corrupt countries in Latin America, the 
increase in corruption rates not only threatens this status but also weakens the capacity of 
its institutions and the country’s democratic stability. 
The illegal drug trade and corruption have also increased the amount of illegal 
economic activities within the Costa Rican financial system. Following the progressive 
increase of suspicious economic activities linked to the drug trade, as of 2020, the United 
States blacklisted Costa Rica as one of the major money laundering countries. This 
 
233 Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo and Agencia Española de Cooperación 
Internacional para el Desarrollo, eds., Informe regional de desarrollo humano: diagnóstico y propuestas 
para América Latina. 2013–2014: Seguridad ciudadana con rostro humano (Buenos Aires: Programa de 
las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2013), 50. 
234 Jorge Vargas Cullell, Luis Rosero Bixby, and Mitchell A. Seligson, La cultura política de la 
democracia en Costa Rica: 2006 (San José, C.R: Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP) de la Univ. 
de Costa Rica, 2006), 45–46. 
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qualification adds to the detriment of the country’s financial health caused by money 
laundering, derived from economic losses due to tax evasion and tax fraud. Deteriorating 
economic conditions in the country may also deter foreign investment, which has a direct 
impact on the generation of sources of employment. Likewise, the impoverishment of the 
state economy directly impacts society by destabilizing the national budget and social aids, 
limiting the state’s capacity to act. Therefore, the intrusion of drug trafficking into the 
Costa Rican economy represents a major threat to its development and stability.  
Finally, the spread of drug trafficking networks is one of the most profound threats 
facing Costa Rica, due to the violence that accompanies their activities. The development 
of drug trafficking in Costa Rica has placed it on the list of countries with the highest drug 
transit through its territory; this increase in the flow of drugs by air, sea, and land has also 
triggered the proliferation of criminal organizations in the country. These criminal 
networks’ positioning has led to an increase in extortion, violence, and homicide rates, with 
homicide rates associated to a greater extent with territorial struggles within these same 
networks. Hence, the rise in violence levels undermines society’s sense of security and the 
peaceful image that the Costa Rican state has had for decades. Faced with this scenario, 
the government is obliged to redirect public expenditures to ensure the containment of 
crime, reducing the state’s capacity to invest in other areas, such as health or education. 
Despite Costa Rica’s lower crime and violence rates compared to the rest of Central 
America, the advance of drug trafficking and its destructive effects have diminished its 
exceptionalism and brought it closer to the reality of its neighboring countries. 
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